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DISPUTED-CONSENT SEARCHES: AN UNCHARACTERISTIC
STEP TowARD REINFORCING DEFENDANTS' PRIVACY
RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects citizens'
rights to privacy by prohibiting unreasonable government searches and
seizures.' Government officials, however, may overcome this barrier by
obtaining a warrant based upon probable cause.2 Courts assess probable
cause through a totality of the circumstances approach that, in order for a
finding, requires information sufficient to justify a reasonably prudent
individual in believing that an offense has been committed. In general,
a person claiming a violation of his or her Fourth Amendment rights
must satisfy two requirements. First, that individual must prove that a
search or seizure actually occurred within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.4 Second, the person must show that the search or seizure
violated reasonableness. 5 Failure to establish both requirements destroys
any Fourth Amendment claim. However, the warrant requirement em-
bodied in the Fourth Amendment is not unconditional, and several ex-
ceptions exist which may allow police officers to engage in a warrantless
search. Specifically, exceptions include: searches incident to a lawful
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Id; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assis-
tance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 53, 54-65 (1996) (providing a general discussion of the Fourth
Amendment).
3. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (explaining further that
probable cause is a practical, non-technical consideration based on the everyday observations of
reasonable people).
4. See, e.g., PHILLIP A. HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIzuRE LAW: A
FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 10-12 (2005) (explaining that standing requires a showing that 1)
the complaining party's privacy right is at issue, 2) a government agent conducted the search or
seizure, and 3) the search or seizure was of the party's person, house, paper, or effects).
5. Id. at 167 (explaining that unreasonableness determinations require a balancing of the
degree and nature of intrusiveness against the weight of the government interest served by the search
or seizure); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (stating generally that "searches con-
ducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions").
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arrest,6 searches made under exigent circumstances, 7 moving vehicle
searches, 8 and searches made upon voluntary consent.
9
This comment addresses the voluntary consent exception to the war-
rant requirement, as applied in the recent Georgia v. Randolph ° deci-
sion. Initially, the Supreme Court qualified the consent exception as
applicable against the individual who provided consent to police. I"
However, soon thereafter, the Court verified the legitimacy of consent
given by a third party, holding that any person reasonably presumed to
possess common authority over the premises could consent to a war-
rantless search.' 2 Specifically, the Court upheld the lawfulness of a
search made pursuant to consent given by a present occupant against the
subsequent objection of the absent nonconsenting co-occupant. 13  Al-
though these cases were instructive for interpreting the consent exception
when the nonconsenting party was absent, the Court did not address the
constitutionality of a warrantless search when two or more present co-
occupants disagreed as to whether police could enter. Tellingly, lower
courts across the nation facing this issue reached opposite holdings con-
cerning the validity of disputed consent searches based on differing in-
terpretations of the relevant Supreme Court precedents. 14
Spurred by this unsettling disparity, the Supreme Court recently ad-
dressed the issue in Georgia v. Randolph. 15 In Part I, this comment will
provide an overview of the relevant Supreme Court decisions that evalu-
ate the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement as it relates to the volun-
tary consent exception. Part II will review the majority, concurring, and
6. E.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (holding that "it is reasonable for the
arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might
seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.").
7. E.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295-96 (1973) (defining exigent circumstances as
those that would endanger the lives of the responding officers, or of others, in the absence of a
timely investigation).
8. E.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-58 (1925) (permitting warrantless
searches of moving vehicles if probable cause suggests the vehicle contains contraband, instruments
of a crime, or evidence of a crime).
9. E.g. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 243 (1973) (permitting warrantless
searches without probable cause when express or implied consent is given).
10. 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).
11. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 243-45 (stating, however, that under some circumstances a third
party may give lawful consent).
12. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (holding that a co-occupant pos-
sessing common authority over the home may consent to a police search against another occupant of
that home, even in spite of that absent, nonconsenting party's refusal); see also Illinois v. Rodriguez,
497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990) (holding that whether the occupant truly possesses common authority
over the premises is immaterial in determining the legality of the consent given; instead, the only
consideration courts must address is whether police were objectively reasonable in thinking that
individual possessed common authority).
13. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170.
14. Compare Primus v. State, 813 N.E.2d 370, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a search
of Defendant's premises upon consent of his roommate was valid despite the defendant's presence),
with State v. Randolph, 604 S.E.2d 835, 837 (Ga. 2004) (holding that a search of Defendant's home
upon consent of his wife, but in his presence and with his clear refusal, was invalid).
15. Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1528 (2006).
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dissenting opinions in Georgia v. Randolph.16 Finally, Part III will ana-
lyze the Court's decision by focusing on: 1) the practical implications of
the decision, specifically with regard to the inherent conflict between
personal privacy and law enforcement, 2) the holding's place within the
established jurisprudential trend of limiting privacy through the third-
party consent legal standard, 3) the benefits and latent costs of the logic
employed in the Randolph opinion, and 4) potential solutions available
for addressing the problems likely to arise in the decision's aftermath.
Ultimately, this comment will conclude that Randolph occupies a posi-
tion of limited authority because its interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment applies only to the rare situation in which multiple, present co-
occupants disagree on the issue of consent. Further, it will be suggested
that the Randolph holding encourages police to circumvent the protective
nature of the holding. And finally, this comment will suggest that
Randolph is likely to generate confusion amongst lower courts and law
enforcement agents, because it is presently unclear whether the holding
signals a reversal of the Court's view of Fourth Amendment searches, or
merely a deviation from a viable trend.
I. BACKGROUND
Among the several exceptions to the warrant requirement, investi-
gating officers find the voluntary consent exception particularly attrac-
tive as an alternative to obtaining a warrant.1 7 This is true for several
reasons. First and foremost, police often seek consent from a suspect
because it permits entry in situations where probable cause does not exist
to substantiate a warrant. 18 Further, even when probable cause does ex-
ist, consent searches function as an instrument of convenience that police
can use to skirt the burdensome process of obtaining a warrant.19 This
factor is particularly true when police would otherwise have to travel
long distances to acquire a warrant.20 Last, officers often prefer consent
searches in lieu of a warrant because the scope of a permissible search
may extend to areas it likely would not reach under the auspices of a
warrant.2'
16. Id. at 1515-43.
17. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 250
(4th ed. 2004) (stating that "[t]he practice of making searches based on consent is by no means a
disfavored one.").
18. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 5 (4th ed. 2004) (explaining that the scope of a consent search is frequently broader
than the scope of a search justified by a warrant, because the consenting party rarely conditions or
qualifies the scope of consent).
19. See id. at 4-5.
20. See id. at 5.
21. See id. (explaining that the objectively reasonable scope of a consent search is frequently
broader than that justified by a search warrant, because the consenting party rarely conditions or
qualifies the scope of consent).
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The general rule governing the voluntary consent exception to the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement holds that the consenting indi-
vidual must give permission voluntarily and under non-coercive circum-
stances.22 Courts regularly uphold both written and verbal consent,
whether given pursuant to a police request, or of the suspect's own voli-
tion. And further, the Supreme Court has upheld the lawfulness of con-
sent searches even under circumstances in which the suspect is not aware
of the right to refuse,23 as well as situations where police have already
taken the suspect into custody. 24 In addition to the requirement that con-
sent to a police search be given voluntarily, these searches are limited in
scope by a standard of "objective reasonableness." 25 Specifically, "ob-
jective reasonableness" evaluates what a reasonable person would under-
stand the scope of consent to include after considering the interchange
between the officer and the suspect. 6 The Supreme Court has addressed
the voluntary consent exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant re-
quirement on several occasions. 27 Those decisions are briefly character-
ized here.
A. Reasonableness as the Standard
In Stoner v. California,8 the Court considered whether a hotel clerk
could lawfully provide police with consent to search a guest's room.
Though recognizing that a clerk does possess some limited right of entry
for purposes such as cleaning or inspecting the room, the Court decided
that a hotel employee does not retain the authority to consent to a search
against the guest.29 The Court reasoned that police have no rational
foundation to conclude that a hotel clerk possesses such authority.30
Three years later, in Katz v. United States,31 the Court elaborated on the
22. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248 (holding that the prosecution has the burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that consent was "in fact voluntarily given and not the result of duress
or coercion, express or implied.").
23. Id. at 248-49 (stating, however, that a person's knowledge of the right to refuse should be
taken into account in the totality of the circumstances determination of whether the consent was
voluntary).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976), but see Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 507-08 (1983) (holding that, on the contrary, when consent given by a suspect unlaw-
fully taken into custody is acted on, it should be considered involuntary and therefore in violation of
the Fourth Amendment).
25. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249 (1991).
26. Id. (referring to "area of consent" as meaning the actual physical parts of the premises that
the consenter has given the officer permission to search).
27. See generally Nancy J. Kloster, Note, An Analysis of the Gradual Erosion of the Fourth
Amendment Regarding Voluntary Third Party Consent Searches: The Defendant's Perspective, 72
N.D. L. REV. 99, 104-15. (1996) (providing a detailed analysis of the Court's trend in deciding co-
occupant consent cases).
28. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
29. Stoner, 376 U.S. at 489.
30. Id. at 488; see also Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-18 (1961) (holding that
a landlord may not consent to a search of the home leased to a tenant, because it is not reasonable for
police to assume that a landlord possesses that authority).
31. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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meaning of "reasonableness" by holding that Fourth Amendment's pro-
tection against warrantless searches was not confined to the home.32
Instead, this protection extended to all areas where the suspect enjoys a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 33  Of particular influence in subse-
quent cases was Justice Harlan's concurring opinion which established a
two-prong inquiry focusing on whether: 1) the suspect had a subjective
expectation of privacy, and 2) society would view that expectation as
reasonable. 
34
B. Assumption of the Risk and Third Party Consent
In Frazier v. Cupp, 35 the Court upheld the legality of consent given
by a third-party based on an assumption of the risk doctrine. Specifi-
cally, the Court held that whenever two or more people jointly use an
item or place, each individual implicitly assumes the risk that the co-
occupant (or co-possessor) might share that item or place with others.3 6
Two years later, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,37 the Court considered
whether the husband-wife relationship supported an inference that either
spouse could consent to a search against the other.38 Acting on the stan-
dard established in Katz, the Court determined that this relationship did
support such an inference because, unlike the situation in Stoner, it is
reasonable for police to assume that one spouse has the authority to con-
sent to a search of the home in the other spouse's absence.39 Shortly
thereafter, the Supreme Court decided the seminal case of United States
v. Matlock,40 and held that any time two or more individuals possess
"common authority" 41 over a premises, the consent of any individual
alone trumps the subsequent objection of another, absent co-occupant.42
In Minnesota v. Olson4 3 however, the Court upheld the privacy rights of
an overnight social guest arrested in the course of a warrantless search,
and held that houseguests have privacy rights parallel to those of occu-
32. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 (finding, under the factual circumstances, that this protection ex-
tended to the content of phone conversations made in a public phone booth).
33. Id. (stating specifically that "[t]hese considerations do not vanish when the search in
question is transferred from the setting of a home, an office, or a hotel room to that of a telephone
booth. Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.").
34. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
35. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
36. Frazier, 394 U.S. at 740 (holding that when two cousins shared use of a bag, one cousin
had authority to consent to a police search because through their joint use, both parties assumed the
risk that the other would share the contents of the bag).
37. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
38. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 489-90.
39. Id. at 474, 487-90.
40. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
41. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 292 (8th ed. 1999) (defining common-authority as: "the
principle that a person may consent to a police officer's search of another person's property if both
persons use, control, or have access to the property.").
42. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171.
43. 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
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pants because "it is unlikely that [the host would] admit someone who
want[ed] to see or meet with the guest over the objection of the guest."
44
C. Further Limiting Privacy
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,45 the Court faced the issue of
whether, in order for the search to comply with the "voluntary" require-
ment,46 police were required to inform the consenting occupant of his or
her right to refuse the search. In light of the expansive view the Court
had taken with regard to warrantless searches, it unsurprisingly held that
a suspect did not have to be aware of the right to refuse the warrantless
search in order for consent to remain valid.47 Finally, in Illinois v. Rod-
riguez48 the Court took its greatest leap yet in restricting defendants'
privacy rights. In Rodriguez, the Court considered a third-party consent
search when the individual who provided consent to police did not actu-
ally reside at the home, and had no common authority over it. 4 9 Never-
theless, the Court held that whether the third-party actually possesses
common authority over the premises is irrelevant to the determination of
the search's validity.5 ° Instead, courts must only address whether it was
objectively reasonable for police to have believed that the third-party had
common authority.51
Therefore, prior to Georgia v. Randolph, the Court established a
clear trend of gradually eroding defendants' Fourth Amendment privacy
rights, while correspondingly broadening the scope of lawful police
searches. By late 2005, an opportunity arose for the Court to address the
consent exception as it applied to multiple co-occupants possessing
common authority over the premises, but who disagreed over consent to
a police search. 52 In light of precedent, as well as the Court's trend of
limiting privacy, little hope must have remained for pro-privacy advo-
cates seeking reinstatement of the protective measures once apparent in
the Fourth Amendment.
44. Olson, 495 U.S. at 99.
45. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
46. See, e.g., Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 (referring to the requirement that consent be given
voluntarily, and under non-coercive circumstances).
47. Id. (holding that, as long as the consenter isn't coerced by police, the prosecution need not
show that the consenter had knowledge of his or her right to refuse in order to establish that consent
was voluntary).
48. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
49. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179.
50. Id. at 188-89.
51. Id. (holding that the search was valid despite the consenting third-party not having com-
mon authority, because it was objectively reasonable to assume that party had common authority
when she was holding a baby and referring to the apartment as "ours").
52. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1520 (stating "[n]one of our co-occupant consent-to-search cases.




II. GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH
A. Facts
In late May of 2001, Scott and Janet Randolph separated when
Janet, along with their son, left the family's Georgia residence and
moved to her parents' home in Canada.53 Janet and her son did not stay
long though, and they returned to Scott at the family's home in Georgia
within two months. 4 On the morning of July sixth, police responded to
a domestic dispute at the Randolph home. 55 When the police arrived,
Janet informed the officers that Scott had removed their son from the
home, and that he would not tell her where the child was. 56 Furthermore,
Janet informed police that Scott was a cocaine addict, and that there were
"items of drug evidence" in the home. 57 Scott proceeded to inform the
officers that he had taken the child to a neighbor's house out of fear that
Janet would leave the country with him again, and further, that it was
Janet and not he who abused drugs and alcohol. 58 After locating the
Randolph's child at the neighbor's house, the responding officers con-
fronted Scott and Janet, both of whom were present outside the house,
and asked for consent to search the home. 59 Despite Scott's unwavering
refusal to consent, Janet gave the officers her permission to enter the
house. 60 Acting on Janet's consent, the officers entered and followed her
into an upstairs bedroom where they found a straw caked with cocaine
residue. 61
B. Procedural History
Scott Randolph was subsequently indicted for possession of cocaine
on the basis of the evidence obtained by the search.62 Upon a motion to
suppress the evidence, the trial court denied Scott's motion. Specifically,
the trial court held that the search was valid because Janet had common
authority over the home, and therefore had the power to consent to the
search.63 After losing at trial, Scott appealed the ruling to the Georgia
Court of Appeals. In reviewing the decision, that court reversed the trial
court's holding, and was later upheld by the state supreme court on the
basis that "consent to conduct a warrantless search of a residence given
by one occupant is not valid in the face of the refusal of another occupant










63. Id. (referring to common authority as defined in Matlock).
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who is physically present at the scene." 64 The Georgia Supreme Court
acknowledged United States v. Matlock65 in its decision, but distin-
guished it because Scott Randolph was physically present to refuse con-
sent.66 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to evaluate the deci-
sion. It affirmed, holding that "a warrantless search of a shared dwelling
for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present
resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of con-
sent given to the police by another resident."
67
C. The U.S. Supreme Court's Decision
1. Majority Opinion
The majority opinion in Georgia v. Randolph holds "that a physi-
cally present inhabitant's express refusal of consent to a police search is
dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant."
68
The majority rests its decision on three points: 1) the social expectations
analysis originally outlined by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in
Katz v. United States, 69 2) United States Supreme Court precedents, and
3) the resolution of potentially troublesome implications of their holding.
a. "Social Expectation" Analysis
The majority's primary theory evaluates reasonableness as a func-
tion of social expectations between co-occupants. 70  To that end, the
opinion presents a hypothetical situation in which someone arrives at a
shared residence and encounters two co-occupants: one inviting entrance,
and another refusing.71 In such a situation, the majority assumes that,
due to widely understood social expectations, "no sensible [visitor]
would go inside., 72 The majority then analogizes the hypothetical guest
to a police officer seeking permission to search, and concludes that be-
cause it would be unreasonable for the guest to enter facing such a dis-
agreement, it would likewise be unreasonable for the officer to enter.7 3
The majority's syllogistic logic leads it to conclude that "[d]isputed per-
mission is thus no match for this [privacy] value of the Fourth Amend-
64. Id. (quoting Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d 834 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)).
65. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
66. Randolph v. State, 604 S.E.2d 835, 836-37 (Ga. 2004).
67. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1526.
68. Id. at 1528.
69. 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
70. Randolph, 125 S. Ct. at 1521 (citing Matlock for the proposition that "the reasonableness
of such a search is in significant part a function of commonly held understanding about the authority
that co-inhabitants may exercise in ways that affect each other's interests.").
71. Id. at 1522-23.








Additionally, the majority considers a prior case that "took a step
toward the issue" of warrantless searches.75 In Minnesota v. Olson,76 the
Court assessed the privacy rights of an overnight social guest arrested in
the course of a warrantless search, and held that houseguests have pri-
vacy rights parallel to those of occupants because "it is unlikely that [the
host would] admit someone who want[ed] to see or meet with the guest
over the objection of the guest.",77 Based on that decision, the majority
goes on to reason that "it presumably should follow that an inhabitant of
shared premises may claim at least as much, and it turns out that the co-
inhabitant naturally has an even stronger claim. 7 8 Accordingly, the U.S.
Supreme Court reinforced the Georgia Supreme Court's holding that
Randolph is distinguishable from Matlock, and therefore not contradic-




The majority concludes by addressing two potentially troublesome
results, and then attempting to dispel them as inconsequential concerns
that are not weighty enough to overpower its ultimate holding. 8' First, it
tackles the apparent double standard created by comparing this holding
with the Court's long-standing endorsement of citizens bringing criminal
activity to light.8 2 Ultimately, the majority reconciles the two by stating
that "society can often have the benefit of [citizens bringing to light
criminal activity of others] without relying on a theory of consent that
ignores an inhabitant's refusal to allow a warrantless search., 83 Specifi-
cally, the majority reasons that the consenting co-occupant can either
deliver the incriminating evidence to police,8 4 or inform police of the
relevant information to assist in obtaining a warrant. 85 Second, the ma-
jority addresses the dissent's primary objection that the holding will
74. Id. at 1524.
75. Id. at 1522 (referring to Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990)).
76. 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
77. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1522 (quoting Olson, 495 U.S. at 99).
78. Id.
79. See id. at 1527.
80. Id. at 1524.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1527; see, e.g., Coolidge, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971) (stating that "it is no part of the
policy underlying the Fourth... Amendment[ ] to discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of
their ability in the apprehension of criminals.").
83. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1524.
84. Id. (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 487-89 (referring to a situation where the defendant's
wife turned incriminating guns over to the police)).
85. Id.
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shield spousal abusers. 86 While recognizing the prevalent domestic vio-
lence problem, 87 the majority characterizes this criticism as a "red her-
ring" 88 and argues that "this case has no bearing on the capacity of the
police to protect domestic victims. ' 89 In support of this proposition, the
majority asserts that police may always enter, under the exigent circum-





Justice Stevens writes a very brief concurring opinion which largely
strays from addressing the issue of disputed consent searches. The con-
currence, which appears to be directed at (and later responded to by)
Justice Scalia, serves almost exclusively to criticize "originalism" as a
tool for constitutional interpretation because it fails to account for
changes in contemporary society. 91 Specifically, Stevens explains that
when the Constitution was adopted in 1791 only a man's consent would
92be of import as a female could not at that time make legal decisions.
Accordingly, under an originalist's viewpoint, police officers seeking
consent to search would only be required to receive permission from the
husband. However, taking special care to highlight the discrepancy, Ste-
vens points out that this concept is no longer valid because, "as a matter
of constitutional law ... the male and the female are equal partners."
93
b. Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer also writes a concurring opinion, his purpose being to
defend against the dissent's assertion that this holding will shield spousal
abusers. Specifically, Breyer stresses the importance of reasonableness
when determining the legality of Fourth Amendment searches, and fur-
ther, that evaluation of reasonableness must turn on the totality of the
circumstances. 94 Accordingly, Breyer notes that under circumstances in
which police officers engage in a consent-based search with the sole ob-
jective being to recover evidence, and one occupant makes a clear objec-
tion, the search would be unreasonable absent any other Fourth Amend-
86. Id. at 1525.
87. Id. (citing numerous government and private statistical reports addressing the widespread
domestic violence problem plaguing U.S. society).
88. Id. at 1526.
89. Id. at 1525.
90. See id. at 1526 (citing United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, 32 (lst Cir. 1992); United
States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883, 885-86 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); People v. Sanders, 904 P.2d
1311, 1313-15 (Colo. 1995)).
91. Id. at 1528-29 (Stevens, J., concurring) (referring to all societal changes, including spe-
cifically the modem day equality of sexes).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1529 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
94. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
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ment exceptions.95 However, Breyer goes on to remark that "were the
circumstances to change significantly, so should the result." 96 In making
this statement, Breyer implies that any sign of domestic violence or other
dangerous conditions would alter the totality of the circumstances, and
potentially make entrance reasonable under the exigent circumstances
exception.
3. Dissenting Opinions
a. Chief Justice Roberts
In the dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts, who is joined by
Justice Scalia, begins by pointing to several deficiencies in the majority
holding. Ultimately, they conclude by identifying what, in their opinion,
is "the correct approach.
97
First, the dissenters argue that the holding establishes a rule that will
apply to various police searches in such a random fashion that it misses
the true interest protected by the Fourth Amendment: a reasonable right
to privacy. 98 In making this point, the dissent draws attention to the fac-
tual similarities present between Randolph, and those in the Matlock99
and Illinois v. Rodriguez.100 This comparison suggests that because
Randolph implicitly contradicts the precedents, the holding is illogical. 10'
In other words, the dissenters argue, a rule that endorses protection for
defendants lucky enough to be standing at the threshold, 102 but not those
sleeping in an adjacent room or detained in a nearby squad car 10 3 is arbi-
trary and unfair. 104 Specifically, the dissent challenges the decision to
draw such a fine line between the nonconsenting occupant who is present
at the threshold to refuse consent, and the nonconsenting occupant who
happens to be away when the police arrive, but later contests the validity
of the search.' 05
The second criticism, which the dissenters argue as being rooted in
the randomness deficiency, suggests that the holding will shield spousal
abusers by prohibiting police intervention when the perpetrator refuses to
95. Id. at 1530.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1531 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
98. See id. at 1531, 1536, 1539.
99. 415 U.S. 164.
100. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
101. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1536 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (stating that "when the develop-
ment of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence leads to such arbitrary lines, we take it as a signal that the
rules need to be rethought").
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1534, 1536 (comparing the protection provided to the defendant in Randolph with
the lack of protection afforded to the defendant in Matlock, who was detained in the police squad
car; or the defendant in Rodriguez, who was napping in the next room).
104. Id. at 1536.
105. See id.
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consent. 106 Although they acknowledge the majority's response, 07 Rob-
erts and Scalia rebut the majority's presumption that domestic violence
automatically gives rise to the exigent circumstances necessary to author-
ize warrantless entrance.10 8  And even in circumstances where it does
apply, justifying the rule on such a contingency is, according to the dis-
sent, unreasonably "strange."'1
0 9
Third, the dissenters argue that the social expectation analogy is
plagued with unfounded assumptions and faulty logic for presupposing
that any reasonable houseguest would automatically leave upon dis-
agreement between roommates. 110 The dissenters attack this assumption
with their own hypotheticals which suggest less clear "social expecta-
tions." For example, what if the guest was a family member; what if the
guest had traveled long distances; or what if the guest was accepted by
several, and only rejected by one roommate?"' And further, the dissent
questions, if the law recognizes no superiority or inferiority between co-
occupants as the majority so clearly pronounces, 112 then why should the
law implicitly assume that the occupant refusing consent prevails?"
13
Finally, the dissent asserts that the majority opinion incorrectly ap-
plies the social expectation analysis as originally articulated in Katz.114
Specifically, the dissent argues that the majority is mistaken because it
uses the analysis to review the issue of consent, rather than correctly
106. Id. at 1531 ("[T]he cost of affording such random protection is great, as demonstrated by
the recurring cases in which abused spouses seek to authorize police entry into a home they share
with a nonconsenting abuser."); see also id. at 1537 ("Perhaps the most serious consequence of the
majority's rule is its operation in domestic abuse situations .... ).
107. Id. at 1538 (referring to the majority response that the dissent's spousal abuse argument is
a "red herring," and the ruling will not shield spousal abusers because of the continued prevalence of
the exigent circumstances exception).
108. Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 290 F.3d 1239, 1240-41 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding no
exigent circumstances justifying entry when police responded to a report of domestic abuse, officers
heard no noise upon arrival, defendant told officers that his wife was out of town, and wife then
appeared at the door seemingly unharmed but resisted husband's efforts to close the door)); see also
id. at 1537 (inferring, as well, that in circumstances where domestic abuse is present but no exigent
circumstances exist to allow police entry, the nonconsenter will "inflict retribution" on the consenter
as soon as police leave).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1532 (stating that "such shifting expectations are not a promising foundation on
which to ground a constitutional rule, particularly because the majority has no support for its basic
assumption - that an invited guest encountering two disagreeing co-occupants would flee - beyond a
hunch about how people would typically act in an atypical situation").
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1523 (Souter, J.) (stating that "there is no societal understanding of superior and
inferior" between co-occupants).
113. Id. at 1532 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (responding to the majority's presumption that a co-
occupant has no authority to demand his guest be admitted by stating that "it seems equally accurate
to say.., that the objector has no 'authority' to insist on getting his way over his co-occupant's wish
that her guest be admitted."); see also id. at 1541 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "men and
women are no more 'equal' in the majority's regime, where both sexes can veto each other's con-
sent, than on the dissent's view, where both sexes cannot").
114. Id. at 1532 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(referring to the two-part test which asked whether: 1) the suspect had a subjective expectation of
privacy, and 2) society would view that expectation as reasonable)).
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applying it to the overall inquiry of reasonableness in the expectation of
privacy." 5 Moreover, as Chief Justice Roberts points out, "the social
expectations concept has not been applied to all questions arising under
the Fourth Amendment, least of all issues of consent."' 16  Therefore,
according to the dissenters, the majority utilizes the social expectation
analysis inappropriately, because it confuses the contextual meaning of
reasonableness. As a result, the dissent claims, social expectations
should not be used to evaluate the Fourth Amendment's protection of
privacy as it relates to the consent exception. 7
The dissent ultimately offers a "correct approach" ' 18 to the issue
presented in Randolph, based on the same assumption of the risk doctrine
prevalent throughout the precedents. 19 Its rationale is very simple: "[i]f
an individual shares information, papers, or places with another, he as-
sumes the risk that the other person will in turn share access to that in-
formation or those papers or places with the government.' 120  Accord-
ingly, it is reasonable for police to search the premises upon the consent
of any single occupant, because all other occupants impliedly assume
that risk by living together. ' 2' The dissent argues that its approach is
preferable because it flows naturally from the precedents, 122 and is logi-
cally grounded in the concept of privacy. 1
23
b. Justice Scalia
In addition to joining Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia offers an
independent response to Justice Stevens's criticism of "originalism."'
124
First, he challenges Stevens's assertion that "originalism" would have
justified police in searching the home over the objection of a married
woman when the Constitution was adopted in 1791.125 He further de-
fends "originalism" by arguing that this mode of constitutional interpre-
tation can operate flexibly, despite Stevens's doubts. Specifically, Scalia
states that "there is nothing new or surprising in the proposition" that the
Constitution may remain unchanged while bodies of law to which it re-
fers do change.' 26  Scalia concludes by criticizing Stevens's "celebra-
tion"'127 of the majority's professed endorsement of women's rights, ar-
115. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1537.
116. Id. (suggesting that the social expectations concept should not be used to examine the
issue of whether consent was reasonable).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1531.
119. See, e.g., Frazier, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
120. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1531 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 1534 (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7).
122. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1536.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1539-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 1540.
126. Id. (arguing that "originalism" does not prohibit the Constitution from taking account of
changes in other bodies of law).
127. Id. at 1541.
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guing that in light of domestic violence patterns the decision will actually
defeat the basis of their pronouncement, and instead lay the foundation
for even greater violence toward women. 128
c. Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas pursues a simple argument unaddressed in the other
opinions. Specifically, he asserts that Coolidge v. New Hampshire
129
"squarely controls this case.," 130  In Coolidge, officers questioned the
wife of an absent defendant pursuant to a homicide investigation. Sub-
sequently, and of her own accord, the wife invited the officers into the
home and permitted them to conduct a search. By their search, the police
obtained guns and clothing belonging to her husband. The evidence later
served to convict him of murder.13' Thomas relies upon the holding in
Coolidge that "when a citizen leads police officers into a home shared
with her spouse to show them evidence.., that citizen is not acting as an
agent of the police, and thus no Fourth Amendment search has oc-
curred."' 132 In doing so, Thomas argues that the facts in Randolph are
indistinguishable from Coolidge.133  Accordingly, Janet Randolph was
not acting as an agent of the officers. For that reason, Justice Thomas
explains, no Fourth Amendment search ever occurred. Therefore, the
trial court's initial denial of the motion to suppress was appropriate. 1
34
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's decision in Georgia v. Randolph135 addressed
whether police could lawfully search the home when one occupant dis-
putes another occupant's consent. 136 Under existing law, lower courts
had reached incongruous results in answering this question, 137 and the
justice system as a whole needed an authoritative ruling from the Su-
preme Court. In Randolph, the Court answered by formulating a clear
rule' 38 which will help lower courts shape future decisions. Jurisdic-
tional differences in holdings deciding this issue, albeit a limited one,
will disappear and the justice system should benefit from a consistent
128. Id.
129. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
130. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1541 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
131. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 446.
132. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1541-42 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at
488-498).
133. Randolph, 126 S. Ct., at 1542.
134. Id. at 1542-43.
135. 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).
136. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1518-19.
137. Compare Primus v. State, 813 N.E.2d 370, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a search
of Defendant's premises upon consent of his roommate was valid despite the Defendant's presence),
with Randolph v. State, 604 S.E.2d 835, 837 (Ga. 2004) (holding that a search of Defendant's home
upon consent of his wife, but his presence and clear refusal, was invalid).
138. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1526 ("We therefore hold that a warrantless search of a shared
dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be
justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident.").
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and predictable approach to the validity of disputed-consent searches.
To that extent, the holding in Randolph is clearly beneficial.
However, the Randolph holding simultaneously forecasts a novel
set of problems that lower courts will have to address as a result. Gener-
ally, this analysis will to point out Randolph's potential deficiencies,
balancing them with the decision's clear benefits for a comprehensive
assessment. Attention will focus on unanticipated practical effects likely
to arise in the aftermath of the holding, scrutinizing the tension between
citizens' privacy rights, and the police's ability to enforce the law. Addi-
tionally, the Court's well-established trend of limiting Fourth Amend-
ment privacy rights will be evaluated, paying heed to issues that may
arise as a result of Randolph's departure from this trend. And finally,
potential solutions available to both courts and police will be suggested
to assist in dealing with these new issues.
A. Privacy Rights Versus Law Enforcement: Practical Implications of
Georgia v. Randolph
1. Practical Implications for Citizens' Privacy Rights
At first glance, the Randolph decision appears to expand privacy
rights, for the first time in several decades of Supreme Court Fourth
Amendment decisions, 139 by holding in favor of the defendant on a vol-
untary consent issue. 140 The Court announces a straightforward holding
that attempts to limit the scope of permissible police searches in favor of
protecting the refusing defendant's privacy. 141 However, in spite of this
seemingly simple directive, there is a strong possibility that Randolph
will actually act to limit the right of privacy even further. This restriction
of rights is most likely to manifest itself through changing police behav-
ior in response to situations of disputed consent.
Specifically, Randolph creates an incentive for police, upon encoun-
tering a situation in which co-occupants might disagree on the issue of
consent, to immediately detain and remove the occupant most likely to
refuse a search. In taking this action, police can then pursue consent
from the remaining occupant without regard to whether the detained oc-
cupant would agree.142 Accordingly, the holding encourages police to
take action that, from a practical standpoint, completely undermines the
rule's original purpose of preserving a nonconsenting co-occupant's pri-
vacy rights in the face of another, consenting occupant. 143 This induce-
139. See supra Part I.
140. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1528 ("This case invites the straightforward application of the rule
that a physically present inhabitant's express refusal of consent to a police search is dispositive as to
him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant.").
141. Id.
142. See id. at 1527 ("[Tjhe potential objector, nearby but not invited to take part in the thresh-
old colloquy, loses out.").
143. See id at 1528.
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ment is further supported because the holding does not purport to over-
rule United States v. Matlock'" or Illinois v. Rodriguez,145 but merely
distinguishes them. In those two cases, the Court held that neither an
occupant sleeping in the next room,146 nor one detained in a squad car, 147
could later object to a search. By refusing to overrule those two deci-
sions, the Court essentially endorsed their holdings as good law, thereby
informing lower courts and police that searches made under similar cir-
cumstances are still legally viable. 148 As a consequence, Randolph will
likely encourage police to circumvent its holding by removing potential
nonconsenting occupants, thereby nullifying the very Fourth Amendment
protections it seeks to espouse.
A second implication of this decision concerns its limited effect on
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. As the majority opinion readily ad-
mits, 149 Randolph confines its authority to such a unique set of circum-
stances that it will very rarely apply. 150 It is interesting that the majority
so readily admits the narrowness of its holding, because earlier in the
opinion it justifies acceptance of this issue in the first place on the judi-
cial system's need for a decision on this issue.'51 Nevertheless, this deci-
sion will be of only limited effect in protecting privacy rights because,
coupled with police incentive to detain hostile suspects, it will be the rare
situation in which lower courts and legal counsel can point to Randolph
as authoritative, controlling authority. Instead of "drawing a fine
line,"' 152 as it did, the Court might have been better served by opting to
rely on the broad and longstanding precedents through application of the
assumption of the risk doctrine, 53 as it concerns co-occupancy. Though
reliance on this doctrine would have forced the Court to come to the op-
posite conclusion, 54 doing so would have enabled the Court to avoid the
144. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
145. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
146. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 180.
147. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 179 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
148. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1527.
149. See id. ("[Ilf [Rodriguez and Matlock] are not to be undercut by today's holding, we have
to admit that we are drawing a fine line; if a potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in
fact at the door and objects, the co-tenant's permission does not suffice for a reasonable search,
whereas the potential objector, nearby but not invited to take part in the threshold colloquy, loses
out.").
150. See id.
151. Compare Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1527 ("[We have to admit that we are drawing a fine
line; if a potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the door and objects, the co-
tenant's permission does not suffice for a reasonable search, whereas the potential objector, nearby
but not invited to take part in the threshold colloquy, loses out.") (emphasis added), with Randolph,
126 S. Ct. at 1520 ("We granted certiorari to resolve a split of authority on whether one occupant
may give law enforcement effective consent to search shared premises, as against a co-tenant who is
present and states a refusal to permit the search.").
152. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1527.
153. See, e.g., Frazier, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
154. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1531 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that if the Court had
relied on the assumption of the risk doctrine, it could only have come to the conclusion that the
search against Mr. Randolph did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
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implicit contradiction with the relevant precedents, 155 while simultane-
ously reinforcing the vitality of a consistent line of decisions dealing
with Fourth Amendment consent searches. 1
56
2. Practical Implications for Law Enforcement
Because all Fourth Amendment decisions implicitly struggle with
the delicate balance between citizens' privacy rights and law enforce-
ment capabilities, Randolph equally carries with it practical implications
for police officers in the course of their work. Although it is difficult to
predict the full extent of changing police behavior following this deci-
sion, both the majority and dissenting opinions reflect on one recurring
situation this holding is almost sure to affect on a regular basis: domestic
violence. Because domestic violence already plagues U.S. society,
157
and because this rule undisputedly affects police response to domestic
violence situations, 158 the opposing opinions devote considerable atten-
tion to the rule's likely effect on the issue. 159  Not surprisingly, they
reach wholly inconsistent conclusions.
While the majority presents a solid argument that the dissent's criti-
cism is a "red herring,'' 60 its opinion fails to look beyond the legal the-
ory in order to appreciate the reality of domestic violence. Moreover,
evidence of domestic violence may permit police entry under the exigent
circumstances exception161 in some disputed-consent circumstances;
however, often times no such evidence will exist to, literally, open the
door to a search. It is easy to foresee a situation in which police respond
to a domestic violence call only to find that no actual violence has yet
been inflicted. Police are powerless to act at that point. However, as
recognized by the dissent, consider the retribution that will be carried out
once the police leave. 162 Similarly, it is likely that police will rarely get
an opportunity to view evidence of violence in the first place, as the bat-
155. E.g., Matlock, 415 U.S. 164; Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990) (referring to contra-
diction created when comparing the decision in Randolph which disallows searches made when the
suspect is standing at the door, to the decisions in Matlock and Rodriguez which allow searches
made when the suspect is either detained in the nearby squad car, or sleeping in an adjacent room).
156. See supra Part 1.
157. See Kapila Juthani, Note, Police Treatment of Domestic Violence and Sexual Abuse:
Affirmative Duty to Protect vs. Fourth Amendment Privacy, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 51, 56
(2003). See generally Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1525 (presenting a substantial list of government and
private reports analyzing the extent and nature of the domestic violence problem in the U.S.).
158. See, e.g., Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515; see also Scheiber v. City of Philadelphia, 156 F.
Supp. 2d 451, 458-59 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (referring to two, of many, relevant Fourth Amendment con-
sent cases where the original police response arose from domestic violence).
159. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1525-26 (explaining the majority's perspective of the hold-
ing's affect on domestic violence); see also id. at 1537-38 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
160. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1526 (referring to its failure to account for the exigent circum-
stances exception).
161. Id. at 1525 n.6 (listing the exigent circumstances that render consent irrelevant).
162. See id at 1537 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that violence will be exacerbated when
domestic disputes are reported, but police are unable to take action due to the lack of evidence which
would permit intervention).
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tered and frightened woman will remain out of view for fear of severe
future consequences if she comes out and pleads for protection.
On a broader level, Randolph will also have the practical effect of
contributing to police officers' general confusion concerning a suspect's
privacy rights. Responding officers will constantly confront unclear
situations where there is not an obvious consenting or nonconsenting
occupant standing at the doorway. Does the refusal still trump if the
refusing occupant is shouting his rebuff up the stairs from the basement?
What if either occupant is under the influence of alcohol or drugs? What
if the nonconsenting occupant is on the telephone with the consenting
occupant, stating his refusal through the phone? Prior to Randolph, these
potential contingencies did not present an issue. Police officers, operat-
ing under the established assumption of the risk principle, 163 needed only
to concern themselves with obtaining consent from the co-occupant
standing in the doorway. Thus, although these possibilities were irrele-
vant prior to Randolph, drawing such a fine line makes these questions
suddenly important.
B. A Departure from the Court's Trend of Limiting Privacy Rights
Beginning with the decision in Frazier v. Cupp,'64 and extending
over thirty years up to Randolph, the Supreme Court adhered to a gener-
ally recognized trend of expanding the validity of warrantless, consent-
based police searches, and correspondingly limiting defendants' privacy
rights under the Fourth Amendment. 165 Consequently, Randolph, which
reinforces the individual privacy interest at the expense of valid police
searches,166 comes as an unexpected departure from this trend. 167 While
the consequences of departing from an identifiable trend in constitutional
interpretation may not necessarily be severe, the resulting judicial uncer-
tainty creates problematic issues.
Prior to Randolph, lower courts across the nation benefited from a
clear understanding of the Supreme Court's consistent trend of upholding
the validity of police searches. However, post-Randolph, courts are sud-
denly placed into a state of confusion about the direction of Fourth
Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence. Specifically, state courts
will struggle to decide whether this decision forecasts an impending re-
versal in Fourth Amendment decision-making, or whether it's merely a
detour in the continued path of generally limiting privacy. This creates a
163. Supra Part I.B.
164. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
165. See generally Kloster, supra note 26, at 104 (providing a detailed analysis of the Court's
trend in deciding Fourth Amendment search cases).
166. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1526.
167. See supra Part I (referring to the trend of limiting privacy rights and expanding the
boundaries of valid warrantless police searches).
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negative impact on the judicial system as a whole because it signals in-
consistency and unpredictability.
C. Unreasonable Reasoning
The logic employed by the majority opinion can be questioned with
regard to two specific facets of the decision. First, a recurrently prob-
lematic result of the holding concerns its apparent neglect of precedent.
Moreover, the majority attempts to deal with this problem by "drawing a
fine line"' 68 and dismissing the contradiction with precedent cases as a
"loose end" 169 to be tied up. 170 However, the reality of the holding, es-
pecially concerning Matlock and Rodriguez, is that the decisions consid-
ered collectively bear little logical relationship to one another. Worse,
the logic employed by the Court in each decision serves to effectively
contradict the logic used in the others. 171 Consideration of the holdings
together begs the question of how justice may be reconciled when a non-
consenting occupant lucky enough to be standing at the threshold pre-
vails, but a nonconsenting occupant napping in the next room, or de-
tained in a nearby squad car, loses out. Factually, the differences are so
minute that the majority struggles to distinguish them. 172 Consequently,
following Randolph a stalemate of Supreme Court decisions pits limited
privacy rights against expansive police discretion to search, and the de-
terminative factor as to which rule will apply falls solely upon the arbi-
trary circumstances surrounding the suspect's location with respect to the
doorway.
Additionally, the "social expectation" reasoning utilized by the ma-
jority as a tool to assess reasonableness is questionable for two reasons.
Initially, the model is faulty because it misses the true inquiry of reason-
ableness as defined by precedent, which is the individual's "legitimate
expectation of privacy."' 173 The majority mistakenly equates this legiti-
mate expectation with the disputed-consent social expectation hypotheti-
cal, 174 assuming without explanation that it leads to the correct conclu-
sion that entry violates reasonableness. However, as the dissent points
out, social expectations comprise a very different set of assumptions than
those encompassing the legitimate expectation of privacy. 75 Accord-
ingly, one might assume that his roommate won't turn over evidence of
168. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1527.
169. Id.
170. See supra Part II.C. 1.c.
171. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1527 (referring to the Randolph holding as compared to Matlock
and Rodriguez).
172. Id. (admitting that they are drawing a fine line, and arguing that the "formalism is justi-
fied").
173. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
174. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1522-23 (referring to the hypothetical situation laid out in the
majority opinion, where a social guest arrives at a residence and is greeted by two co-occupants in
disagreement over whether the guest may enter).
175. Id. at 1533.
20061
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
his drug problem to police, based on social expectations between
them. 176 However, because he shares a living space with that roommate,
any legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to their shared dwelling
has "already been frustrated,"' 177 and regardless of friendship-based ex-
pectations between them, there can be no legitimate expectation of pro-
tection from police searches if consent is given by one roommate. Thus,
the majority's reliance on the social expectation hypothetical could be
considered inappropriate because it equates the social expectations of co-
occupants with the legitimate expectations of privacy. The concepts are
different, and accordingly yield different results. 1
78
The second problem that arises with regard to the hypothetical is the
majority's unwarranted assumption that the nonconsenting occupant's
decision prevails in the event of a disputed-consent situation. 179 More-
over, the majority opinion clearly holds that whenever two co-occupants
disagree on the issue of consent to a police search, the nonconsenting
occupant prevails. This assumption generates query as to why, when the
occupants share an equal status of authority, 180 the party refusing consent
must be considered the winner. 181 Thus, the social expectation analysis
could be considered imperfect even within its own boundaries, because it
stresses the fact that co-occupants share equal authority, but then as-
sumes without justification that the nonconsenting occupant prevails in
situations of dispute.
D. Solutions
Despite the unanticipated problems likely to arise following the Su-
preme Court's holding in Randolph, some possible solutions exist that
may assist to alleviate any negative affects. First and foremost, judges
deciding Fourth Amendment disputed-consent search cases should en-
gage in an intensive fact-based analysis of the situation in front of them,
and require the particular situation to precisely match Randolph's distinct
factual background before applying it as precedent. Although Randolph
seems to inherently conflict with prior precedents such as Matlock and
Rodriguez, if courts can devote special attention to the factual back-
ground so as to apply the respective precedents only to identical factual
176. ld.
177. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (referring to the meaning of a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the context of co-occupancy).
178. Id.
179. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1523 (stating that "there is no societal understanding of superior
and inferior" between co-occupants).
180. Id. at 1523 ("[T]here is no common understanding that one co-tenant generally has a right
or authority to prevail over the express wishes of another, whether the issue is the color of the cur-
tains or invitations to outsiders,").
181. Id. at 1532 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It seems equally accurate to say - based
on the majority's conclusion that one does not have a right to prevail over the express wishes of his
co-occupant - that the objector has no 'authority' to insist on getting his way over his co-occupant's
wishes that her guest be admitted." (emphasis added)).
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situations, no overbearing contradictions will arise. Doing this will alle-
viate the confusion created by the Supreme Court's seemingly conflict-
ing decisions by limiting the scope of future holdings to situations which
match the appropriate precedents.
Second, courts should embrace a Preliminary Effort Test, 8 2 which
requires officers pursuing a co-occupant consent search to, at least, make
an initial attempt to obtain consent from all accessible inhabitants. Spe-
cifically, this test would initially require responding officers engaged
with any occupant of the residence to inquire as to whether any other co-
occupants are present on the premises. If the officers are led to believe
that other occupants are at home, this test would additionally require the
police to obtain consent from all additional occupants before entering to
search. Adoption of this test would be beneficial for several reasons.
First, the Preliminary Effort Test is commensurate with the reasonable-
ness inquiry explicit in the Fourth Amendment, 83 because it requires
police to take the simple step of initially asking whether other occupants
are present, and then obtaining consent from any that are there. Simi-
larly, this test reinforces the enduring vitality of the warrant requirement
in the Fourth Amendment' 8 4 because police would be required to pursue
the alternate course of obtaining a warrant in the event that a roused co-
occupant decides to refuse the search. Last, application of this test would
benefit the judicial system by preventing officers from circumventing the
purpose of Randolph 's holding by immediately detaining potential non-
consenting occupants.185 Incongruous situations similar to Matlock or
Rodriguez would not arise to frustrate the holding, because police would
be required to make an initial effort to seek out other inhabitants, and
receive consent from them before engaging in a search. Although this
test creates an added burden on police, it would greatly reduce the possi-
bility of engaging in an illegal search.
Finally, in the event that police are unable to obtain a warrant, they
should be encouraged to pursue the traditional alternatives to a war-
rantless search more readily. For one, officers responding to situations
of disputed consent should simply request that the consenting occupant
retrieve and hand over any incriminating evidence that the officers hope
to discover in the event of a search. This alternative is likely to be viable
in many disputed consent circumstances where the two occupants are at
odds with one another,18 6 as the consenting individual will be willing to
182. See Elizabeth A. Wright, Note, Third Party Consent Searches and the Fourth Amend-
ment: Refusal, Consent, and Reasonableness, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1841, 1874-77 (2005)
(proposing the "Reasonable Attempt Test"); Gregory S. Fisher, Search and Seizure, Third Party
Consent: Rethinking Police Conduct and the Fourth Amendment, 66 WASH. L. REv. 189, 202-08
(1991) (proposing "Discretionary Restraint" as a framework for addressing third-party consent).
183. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
184. Id.
185. See supra Part III.A.2
186. See, e.g., Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
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take whatever steps are necessary to implicate their co-occupant. Addi-
tionally, when the consenting occupant is unable or unwilling to deliver
the incriminating evidence to the responding officers, they can at least
aid the officers in obtaining a legitimate search warrant by establishing
probable cause. In choosing to pursue either of these warrantless search
alternatives, police will benefit by preserving the ability to obtain in-
criminating evidence against the suspect, while at the same time elimi-
nating the possibility of engaging in a warrantless search.
CONCLUSION
In the immediate wake of Georgia v. Randolph, the decision's long-
term impact on Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence is
unclear. While the holding may signal a pending reversal in the Court's
prior predilection to limiting citizens' privacy rights, it may also repre-
sent only a slight divergence in a continually viable trend. Perhaps the
Court will have the opportunity to resolve this query in future decisions,
potentially even those based on Randolph's shortcomings. Regardless of
its eventual impact, Randolph currently holds a position of limited appli-
cation which is likely to create confusion and foster practical dilemmas.
As Randolph begins to assert its presence in the world of Fourth
Amendment privacy rights, one can only hope that, as the majority opin-
ion suggests, these problematic issues prove to be mere "loose ends"'
187
capable of being tied up.
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187. Id. at 1527.
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